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OUT OF THE RABBIT HOLE: THE D.C. CIRCUIT BRINGS
THE EPA BACK FROM WONDERLAND IN
NEWERSEY V EPA
I. INTRODUCTION
Though few people noticed, in the early 1950s, increasing
numbers offish were floating dead in Minamata Bay, Japan.' Then,
as if channeling Alfred Hitchcock, crows were seen inexplicably fall-
ing from the sky. 2 Cats started "dancing" in the streets. 3 Neighbors
then slowly began noticing each other stumble while walking, slur
speech, and drop chopsticks at dinner.4 Then things started get-
ting worse. Stumbles became full-blown paralysis; trouble holding
chopsticks became gnarled hands and involuntary muscle spasms;
and the newest generation of townspeople was born with horrific
birth defects. 5
The culprit was Minamata disease, more commonly known as
mercury poisoning.6 In 1932, the Chisso Corporation, a pillar in
the local community for decades, began to manufacture acetalde-
hyde, a chemical used for producing plastics. 7 Mercury from the
production process continuously leaked into Minamata Bay, where
it amassed for years.8 A few years and a chemical process later, the
mercury entered the food chain in the forn of methylmercury chlo-
ride-a form of mercury that is easily absorbed by humans. 9 The
mercury accumulated in fish and shellfish-the townspeople's sole
1. SeeJoseph Coleman, 50 Years Later, Many Victims offapan's Worst Eco-Disaster
Still Struggle for Redress, ASSOCIATED PREss, Sept. 30, 2007 (providing brief history of
Minamata disaster).
2. See id. (providing history of Minamata tragedy).
3. See Douglas Allchin, The Tragedy and Triumph of Minamata: A Paradigm for
Understanding Ecological, Human-Environment and Culture Technology Interactions, 61
Am. BIOLOGY TcHR. 413, 414 (1999) (providing history of Minamata disaster). Cats
would also be seen falling into the sea and dying, which townspeople began to
term "cat suicides." Id.
4. See id. (discussing early effects of mercury poisoning in Minamata Bay).
5. See Coleman, supra note 1 (providing brief history of Minamata disaster).
6. See id. (citing mercury poisoning as cause of Minamata disaster).
7. See Allchin, supra note 3, at 414 (discussing Chisso Corporation's role in
local economy).
8. See id. (discussing events leading up to mercury exposure in Minamata
Bay).
9. See id. (explaining how mercury entered food chain); see also Hold the Sushi,
THE ECONOMIsT, Aug. 27, 2009, available at http://www.economist.com/world/
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source of protein. 10 Two thousand townspeople died from eating
contaminated fish and as many as thirty thousand others suffered
from the symptoms of Minamata disease. 1I
While today the Minamata tragedy is a distant memory to
some, and a story glossed over in high school biology for others, it
had the remarkable effect of kick-starting the Japanese environ-
mental movement and waking up the international community to
the horrifying effects of mercury exposure. 12 The Minamata epi-
sode illuminates a problem that lingers to this day: the dominant
medium of mercury exposure is consuming fish with high levels of
mercury. 13 As a result of the Minamata tragedy, and an increased
body of knowledge as to mercury's effects on humans, mercury ex-
posure has become an enormous concern for governments and
their environmental regulatory agencies. 14
This Note analyzes the District of Columbia Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision in New Jersey v. EPA15 to vacate two Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) determinations: (1) the decision to re-
move electric utility steam generating units (EGUs) from the list of
sources of hazardous air pollutants (HAPs); and (2) the promulga-
tion of the Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR), creating a voluntary
cap-and-trade system for mercury emissions from EGUs. 16 This
10. See Allchin, supra note 3, at 414 (noting particular danger of high mercury
levels in fish for Minamata Bay townspeople).
11. See Coleman, supra note 1 (noting Japanese courts are forcing Japanese
government to recognize many new victims of Minamata disease).
12. See id. (discussing the genesis of Japanese environmental movement).
The Minamata tragedy "gave birth to the Japanese environmentalist movement,
and like the Chernobyl nuclear meltdown and the Union Carbide chemical disas-
ter in Bhopal, India, it became an international cause c~lbre." Id. (discussing
effects of Minamata disaster in public sphere).
13. See Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825, 79,827 (Dec. 20,
2000) (removing electric utility steam generating units from list of sources of haz-
ardous air pollutants). "[F]ish consumption dominates the pathway for human
and wildlife exposure to mercury." Id. Mercury levels are particularly high in
larger species of fish (e.g., shark, tuna, swordfish), as mercury accumulates as it
moves up the food chain. See Hold the Sushi, supra note 9 (highlighting lingering
dangers of mercury levels in fish).
14. See OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA-453/R-98-004A,
STUDY OF HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANT EMISSIONS FROM ELECTRIC UTILITY STEAM
GENERATING UNITS-FINAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 7-17 (1998) [hereinafter 1998
EPA HAP REPORT] (considering mercury as "highest priority for multipathway
analyses"), available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/oarpg/t3/reports/eurtcl.pdf.
15. NewJersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
1308 (2009), and cert. dismissed, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009).
16. For a narrative analysis of New Jersey v. EPA, see infra notes 97-121 and
accompanying text. For a critical analysis of NewJersey v. EPA, see infra notes 122-
69 and accompanying text.
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Note also analyzes the decision's potential impact on mercury regu-
lations, as well as the effect that the decision may have on future
regulation of other pollutants. 17 A particular focus is placed on car-
bon dioxide (C0 2 ). i s Section II lays out the facts and procedural
history of New Jersey v. EPA.19 Section III provides the legal frame-
work needed to understand the regulatory process under the Clean
Air Act (CAA).2° Section IV provides a narrative of the court's rea-
soning in New Jersey v. EPA.21 Section V critically analyzes the
court's reasoning and argues that the court correctly applied the
law and reached the proper conclusion, albeit through a less than
complete discussion. 22 Finally, Section VI discusses the impact of
the court's decision on the regulatory regime over new and existing
EGUs.23 This Note ultimately concludes that, while the decision
may have closed the door on regulating EGU emissions of CO 2
under section 111 of the CAA, the holding does leave available a
more substantial regulatory option in regulating CO 2 under section
112.24
II. FACTS
The decision of the D.C. Circuit in New Jersey v. EPA finds its
roots in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 (1990 Amend-
ments). 25 The 1990 Amendments required the EPA to conduct a
study on the possible hazards to public health that can be reasona-
bly anticipated from EGU emissions. 26 Based on the study's find-
17. For a discussion on how New Jersey v. EPA may affect future regulation of
pollutants not yet listed as a HAP, see infra notes 196-220 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion on how New Jersey v. EPA may impact carbon dioxide
(CO 2) regulations, see infra notes 202-20 and accompanying text.
19. For a discussion of relevant facts in New Jersey v. EPA, see infra notes 25-59
and accompanying text.
20. For a discussion of relevant background material, see infra notes 60-96
and accompanying text.
21. For a narrative analysis of the court's opinion in New Jersey v. EPA, see infra
notes 97-121 and accompanying text.
22. For a critical analysis of the court's opinion in New Jersey v. EPA, see infra
notes 122-69 and accompanying text.
23. For a discussion of the impact on the regulatory structure over new and
existing EGUs, see infra notes 170-223 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion on how New Jersey v. EPA may affect CO2 emission regula-
tions, see infra notes 202-20 and accompanying text.
25. See ROBERT MELTZ & JAMES E. MCCARTHY, CONG. RES. SERV., ORD. No.
RS22817, THE D.C. CIRCUIT REJECTS EPA's MERCURY RULES: New Jersey v. EPA 3
(2008) [hereinafter CRS, CASE REPORT], available at http://assets.opencrs.com/
rpts/RS22817_20080228.pdf (discussing events leading up to New jersey v. EPA).
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n) (1) (A) (2006) (requiring EPA to undertake study
into reasonably anticipated health effects resulting from EGU emissions).
2010]
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ings, the EPA Administrator would determine whether regulating
HAP emissions from EGUs is "appropriate and necessary."27 This
study was initiated soon after the 1990 Amendments were enacted,
and in 1998 the findings were issued in the EPA's report to Con-
gress, Study of Hazardous Air Pollutant Emissions from Electric Utility
Steam Generating Units (the HAP Report).28 The report presented
an in-depth analysis of industry background, testing methods, and
the health effects of several HAPs.29 Mercury emissions, however,
were of greatest concern due to the particular threat the chemical
posed to humans. 30
Mercury is an especially potent and resilient neurotoxin that
primarily targets the nervous system, kidneys and developing fe-
tuses. 31 It affects the respiratory, cardiovascular, gastrointestinal,
hemotologic, immune and reproductive systems as well. 32 Develop-
ing fetuses face the most serious risks because they are more likely
to suffer from severe neurological and developmental problems at
lower doses than those who are exposed in their adult years. 33 The
27. See id. (setting forth required findings for EPA to regulate HAP emissions
from EGUs).
28. See 1998 EPA HAP REPORT, supra note 14 (reporting findings of study con-
ducted under mandate of section 112(n) (1) (A)).
29. See generally id. (summarizing relevant information on industry back-
ground, testing methods, and health effects of several HAPs).
30. See id. at 7-45 (noting particular concern with health effects resulting from
mercury exposure). "Mercury is considered the highest priority for multipathway
analyses because it is an environmentally persistent, toxic element." Id.
31. See id. at 7-17 (discussing health effects of mercury exposure). Incidents
of high-dose and widespread exposure to methylmercury in Japan and Iraq have
demonstrated that neurotoxicity is the greatest health concern when the develop-
ing fetus is exposed to methylmercury. Id. at ES-16 (mentioning highly publicized
episodes of mercury exposure). The incident in Japan was the result of industrial
releases of mercury into Minamata Bay; the mercury ultimately entered the food
chain, poisoning thousands. For a further discussion of the episode, see supra
notes 1-14 and accompanying text. In the winter of 1971-1972, a wave of
methylmercury poisonings hit rural Iraq. See Center for Environmental Health Sci-
ences at Dartmouth, Mercury: Element of the Ancients, http://www.dartmouth.edu/
-toxmetal/metals/stories/mercury.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2009) (discussing
mercury poisoning episode in Iraq). In what was initially a well-meaning humani-
tarian response to famine in the country, several nations sent wheat seeds that had
been treated with a methylmercury-containing fungicide. Id. Warnings on the
bags of seeds were printed in Spanish (many of the seeds had originated in Mex-
ico) and were incomprehensible to rural Iraqis. Id. The skull and crossbones - a
marking signifying poison in the West - meant nothing to the Iraqis. Id. Facing
starvation, the Iraqis ground and milled the seed directly into flour, and made
contaminated bread. Id.
32. See 1998 EPA HAP REPORT, supra note 14, at 7-17 (discussing biologic sys-
tems most affected by mercury exposure in humans).
33. See id. (noting particular vulnerability of developing fetuses to effects of
mercury exposure). "Neurotoxicity in offspring is the most commonly observed
effect and the effect seen at lowest exposures." Id.
4
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HAP Report cites impaired development of motor skills, "cerebral
palsy, altered muscle tone and deep tendon reflexes, and reduced
neurological test scores" as the most common effects of prenatal
exposure to mercury.34 Due to the particular risk that the develop-
ing fetus faces in suffering from these effects, the EPA has ex-
pressed the greatest concern for women of child-bearing age being
exposed to mercury. 35
The HAP Report pointed to a "plausible link" between indus-
trial emissions of mercury and methylmercury-an especially po-
tent and dangerous form of mercury-in fish.36 The EPA estimated
that "roughly 60 percent of the total mercury deposited in the U.S.
comes from U.S. anthropogenic air emission sources."37 Coal- and
oil-fired EGUs represented the largest source of mercury in the
United States, accounting for thirty to forty percent of domestic an-
thropogenic emissions.38
In light of these findings, the EPA concluded that "fish con-
sumption dominates the pathway for human and wildlife exposure
to mercury. ' 39 Accordingly, the EPA determined that EGU emis-
sions of mercury were a threat to both public health and the envi-
ronment.40 Further, the EPA Administrator determined that it was
appropriate and necessary to regulate HAP emissions from coal-
and oil-fired EGUs under section 112 of the CAA.41 Section 112
34. Id. at 7-18 (mentioning common health effects upon exposure to mer-
cury). The HAP Report particularly notes diminished abilities to walk and talk
among fetuses affected by prenatal mercury exposure. Id.
35. See Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825, 79,827 (Dec. 20,
2000) (expressing concern over women of child-bearing age consuming mercury-
contaminated fish).
36. See 1998 EPA HAP REPORT, supra note 14, at 7-43 (finding link between
EGU mercury emissions and mercury levels in soil, sediments, air and water). Af-
ter being emitted into the air, mercury falls back to earth, entering streams, lakes
and rivers, where it can accumulate in the flesh of fish. See Cornelia Dean, Environ-
mentalists Advance on Emissions, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 24, 2009, at A16 (discussing link
between airborne mercury emissions and accumulation in fish).
37. Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 79,827 (estimating proportion of mercury emitted by domestic anthropo-
genic sources).
38. See id. (concluding EGUs represent substantial portion of domestic an-
thropogenic sources of mercury); Hold the Sushi, supra note 9 (attributing forty
percent of anthropogenic mercury emissions to coal-fired power plants).
39. Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 65 Fed.
Reg. at 79,827 (finding contaminated fish consumption is principal medium of
mercury exposure).
40. See id. at 79,830 (stating Administrator's findings regarding threat of mer-
cury emissions to health and environment).
41. See id. at 79,830 (concluding EGU emissions of HAPs should be regulated
under CAA section 112).
2010]
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dictates that an appropriate and necessary finding is required
before adding EGUs to the HAP source list.42
The EPA then announced that the appropriate and necessary
finding compelled the conclusion that coal- and oil-fired EGUs
should be regulated under section 112 of the CAA. 43 The an-
nouncement was made with just one month remaining in the Clin-
ton Administration, on December 20, 2000.4 4 The EPA was then
left to promulgate HAP emission standards for EGUs.45
In early 2004, after a change in presidential administrations,
the EPA proposed two alternative regulatory programs to control
HAP emissions from coal- and oil-fired EGUs. 46 The first option
would follow the proposal made by the EPA Administrator in 2000
and regulate EGUs under section 112 by imposing Maximum
Achievable Control Technology (MACT) standards. 47 The second
option was an about-face, proposing a complete reversal of the ap-
propriate and necessary finding made during the Clinton Adminis-
tration, thereby removing EGUs from the HAP source list and
regulating HAP emissions under the less stringent standards of sec-
tion 111.48
The EPA sought comment from the public and ultimately de-
cided to go with the latter option, announcing in March 2005, that
it was removing EGUs from the HAP source list and regulating mer-
cury emissions under section 111. 49 To justify its delisting decision,
the EPA relied on its interpretation of section 112(n) (1)-a section
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n) (1) (A) (2006) (specifying requirements for adding
EGUs to HAP source-list).
43. See generally Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollu-
tants, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825 (adding coal- and oil-fired EGUs to HAP source list).
44. Id. (announcing section 112 regulatory program for coal- and oil-fired
EGUs).
45. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e) (4) (limitingiudicial review only to regulations lim-
iting HAP emissions, not addition to list of HAP sources). Adding EGUs to the list
of HAP sources did not constitute a final agency action subject to judicial review.
Id. As such, a challenge to this determination would have to come once the regu-
lations had been promulgated. Id.
46. See generally Proposed National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants; and, in the Alternative, Proposed Standards of Performance for New
and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 69 Fed.
Reg. 4652 (Jan. 30, 2004) (proposing two regulatory alternatives for regulating
HAP emissions from coal- and oil-fired EGUs).
47. See id. at 4662-64 (summarizing section 112 maximum achievable control
technology rule for EGUs).
48. See id. at 4689-91 (proposing performance standards and emission guide-
lines for EGU mercury emissions).
49. See Revision of December 2000 Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of
Hazardous Air Pollutants from Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and the
Removal of Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units from the
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setting out procedures for adding EGUs to the HAP source list-
stating that it had the authority to reverse its 2000 decision by mak-
ing a "negative appropriate and necessary finding. '50
The EPA also interpreted section 112(c) (9) -the section con-
cerning how source categories can be removed from the source
list-as inapplicable to EGUs, because adding EGUs to the HAP
source list did not constitute a final agency action. 51 Further, the
EPA claimed that the statutory criteria had not been met at the
time the listing decision was made.52 Accordingly, having con-
cluded that it had the authority to bypass the delisting procedures
in section 112(c) (9), the EPA determined that the delisting wasjus-
tified because regulating EGUs was neither "appropriate" nor "nec-
essary.'53  Accordingly, the EPA promulgated the Clean Air
Mercury Rule (CAMR), which implemented plant-specific "stan-
dards of performance" for mercury emissions for new coal-fired
EGUs and supplemented a national cap on mercury emissions with
a voluntary cap-and-trade program. 54
Section 112(c) List, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,994 (Mar. 29, 2005) (revising December 2000
"appropriate and necessary" finding).
50. Id. at 16,032 (making "negative appropriate and necessary" determina-
tion). Section 112(n)(1)(A) provides that "[t]he Administrator shall perform a
study of the hazards to public health reasonably anticipated to occur as a result of
emissions by [EGUs] of [HAPs] . . . [and] shall regulate [EGUs] under this sec-
tion, if the Administrator finds such regulation is appropriate and necessary after
considering the results of the study . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n)(1)(A) (setting re-
quirements for regulating EGUs under section 112).
51. See Revision of December 2000 Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of
Hazardous Air Pollutants, 70 Fed. Reg. at 16,033 (determining section 112(c) (9)
delisting criteria is inapplicable in instances of errors in original determination or
upon considering new information).
52. See id. (finding section 112(c) (9) delisting criteria inapplicable to listing
decisions not made in compliance with CAA provisions). Section 112(c)(9)
provides:
The Administrator may delete any source category from the [HAP
source] list . . . whenever the Administrator ... [determines] that emis-
sions from no source category or subcategory concerned exceed a level
which is adequate to protect public health with an ample margin of safety
and no adverse environmental effect will result from emissions from any
source.
42 U.S.C. § 7412(c) (9) (B) (ii) (setting requirements for removing source catego-
ries from HAP source-list).
53. See Revision of December 2000 Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of
Hazardous Air Pollutants, 70 Fed. Reg. at 16,032-33 (finding regulating EGUs
under section 112 is neither appropriate nor necessary).
54. See generally Emission Guidelines and Compliance Times for Coal-Fired
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units Hg Trading Program General Provisions,
40 C.F.R. pt. 60.4101-4176 (2008) (setting standards of performance for mercury
emissions and initiating cap-and-trade program for mercury emissions).
2010]
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Several states and environmental groups brought suit against
the EPA in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals challenging the valid-
ity of the EPA's actions of delisting EGUs from the HAP source list
and implementing the CAMR.5 5 The petitioners alleged that the
EPA had no authority to delist EGUs from the HAP source list with-
out taking the steps required by section 112(c)(9).56 The court
agreed, holding that the delisting was invalid, and vacated both
rules accordingly. 57 The court then remanded CAMR's perform-
ance standards to the EPA for reconsideration. 58 After an appeal by
the Utility Air Regulatory Group, an intervenor in the case, the Su-
preme Court denied certiorari, allowing the D.C. Circuit's opinion
to stand.59
III. BACKGROUND
A. Origins of the Clean Air Act
In 1970, Congress added section 112 to the CAA.60 The origi-
nal section gave the EPA ninety days to list HAPs that are "likely to
cause an increase in death or serious illness."61 Within one year
after listing these pollutants, the EPA was to propose regulations,
provide notice of a public hearing on those regulations, and pro-
mulgate regulations governing the emissions of HAPs. 62
Over the course of the following eighteen years, the EPA listed
only eight pollutants and promulgated regulations for seven, in-
cluding mercury.63 Of those seven HAPs, the EPA regulated only a
55. See New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 581 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (listing petition-
ers). The governmental petitioners consisted of fifteen states, the Michigan De-
partment of Environmental Quality, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection and the City of Baltimore. Id.
56. See id. (describing petitioners' contentions).
57. See id. at 583-84 (vacating Delisting Rule and CAMR).
58. See id. (ordering EPA to reconsider CAMR).
59. See Util. Air Reg. Group v. New Jersey, 129 S. Ct. 1308 (2009) (denying
certiorari).
60. See Clean Air Act, Pub. L. No. 91-604, § 4(a), 84 Stat. 1676, 1685 (1955)
(amended 1970) (striking out section 107, redesignating sections 108-11 as sec-
tions 115-18, and adding sections 107-14 to CAA) [hereinafter 1970 Amendments].
61. Id. (requiring EPA to identify and list hazardous air pollutants).
62. See id. (allowing 180 days to list pollutants, thirty days to provide public
hearing, and 180 days to promulgate regulations). The emission standards were to
be set at "the level which in [the Administrator's] judgment provides an ample
margin of safety to protect the public health from such hazardous pollutant." Id.
63. S. REP. No. 101-228, at 131 (1989) (discussing reasons for amending
CAA). The EPA listed mercury, beryllium, asbestos, vinyl chloride, benezene, ra-
dionuclides, inorganic arsenic, and coke oven emissions. Id. The EPA had not
promulgated emission standards for coke oven emissions. Id. (expressing concern
with slow pace of EPA's listing HAPs).
8
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few of the source categories. 64 Because of the EPA's slow pace in
regulating harmful emissions, Congress ultimately determined that
"[t]he law ha[d] worked poorly" and recognized the need for a new
regulatory scheme. 65
B. Enter 1990 Amendments
Frustrated with the EPA's seeming unwillingness to issue regu-
lations, Congress passed the 1990 Amendments. 66 These amend-
ments removed much of the EPA's discretion in regulating HAPs. 67
The 1990 Amendments named nearly 200 HAPs, including mer-
cury, and mandated that they all be regulated by the EPA.6' The
1990 Amendments also required the EPA to list "all categories and
subcategories of major sources and area sources" that emit one or
more HAPs.69
64. See id. (expressing discontent with enforcement of CAA provisions to
date). The Senate Report singles out power plant emissions of mercury as an ex-
ample of the light regulation of HAPs. See id. One reason that the EPA had been
so reluctant to impose regulations was the statutory language employed in the orig-
inal version of section 112. Id. at 128. Providing "an ample margin of safety to
protect public health" had been initially interpreted as meaning zero exposure to
carcinogenic materials. Id. The EPA was not willing to issue such severe regula-
tions, as "they would shutdown [sic] major segments of American industry." Id.
The 1990 Amendments to the CAA sought to restructure the statutory scheme so
that HAPs could be more effectively regulated. Id. (discussing intended effects of
1990 Amendments).
65. See id. at 128 (expressing concern with enforcement of CAA provisions
prior to enacting 1990 Amendments). The Senate Report also points to a 1987
case out of the D.C. Circuit criticizing the EPA for its methodology in promulgat-
ing regulations. See generally Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146
(D.C. Cir. 1987) [hereinafter NRDC] (holding that EPA cannot use cost as factor
in imposing emission regulations). In NRDC, pursuant to section 112 provisions,
the EPA had proposed emission regulations for vinyl chloride. Id. at 1148. Given
the potency of vinyl chloride, however, the EPA determined that issuing regula-
tions that would provide "an ample margin of safety to protect public health"
would require prohibiting vinyl chloride emissions at any level. Id. The EPA deter-
mined that requiring zero vinyl chloride emissions "could require closure of an
entire industry," and abandoned these emission standards, imposing a set of less
stringent (though still strict) best achievable control technology requirements. Id.
at 1148-49. The court held that the EPA inappropriately considered cost when
promulgating these emission standards, noting that section 112 requires only that
the EPA consider the effects on human health, with cost only becoming a factor
when considering the margin of safety. Id. at 1164. Accordingly, the court vacated
the rule and ordered the EPA to reconsider its prior determination. Id. at 1166.
66. See Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 301, 104
Stat. 2399, 2531-74 (1990) (amending section 112 of CAA).
67. See id. (providing list of nearly 200 HAPs that must be regulated and pro-
viding specific listing and delisting procedures for regulating HAP sources).
68. See id. (mandating that EPA regulate nearly 200 specific HAPs).
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Once a source appears on this list, it is subject to strict pollu-
tion control requirements. 70 New sources must implement, at the
very least, pollution control measures achieving the "maximum de-
gree of reduction in emissions" as measured by "the emission con-
trol that is achieved in practice by the best controlled similar
source."7 1 Existing sources, once added to the list, must meet emis-
sions standards that are at least as stringent as the "average emis-
sion[s] . . . achieved by the best performing 12 percent of the
existing sources." 72
In addition, Congress limited the EPA's ability to intervene in
regulating HAP sources. 73 In order to remove a HAP source from
this list, the EPA must first determine that emissions from that
source do not "exceed a level which is adequate to protect public
health with an ample margin of safety" and that "no adverse envi-
ronmental effect will result from any source." 74 Congress also listed
specific criteria for adding EGUs to the list of HAP sources. 75 The
EPA was first required to perform a study analyzing the potential
health hazards from HAP emissions from EGUs. 76 After reviewing
this study, the EPA could add EGUs to the HAP source list upon a
finding that it was appropriate and necessary to do so. 7 7
C. Promulgating the Clean Air Mercury Rule
In the waning days of the Clinton Administration, the EPA re-
leased a notice discussing its conclusions from the HAP Report on
the potential hazards to public health that can reasonably be antici-
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (3) (2006) (setting pollution control requirements
for HAP source categories).
71. Id. (setting guidelines for HAP emission regulations of new source
categories).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (3) (A) (setting standards by which HAP emission reg-
ulations must be set for existing source categories). For categories or subcatego-
ries with less than thirty sources, the metric is the average emission levels of the
five best performing sources instead of the best performing twelve percent. 42
U.S.C. § 7412(d) (3) (B).
73. See 4 2 U.S.C. § 7412(c) (9) (B) (ii) (limiting agency discretion in reversing
prior listing determinations).
74. Id. (setting required findings that must be made before removing source
category from section 112 list). Challenges to additions to this list may not be
made until after the Administrator has promulgated emissions standards for the
pollutant or source. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e)(4) (limiting judicial review only after
EPA promulgates regulations, not merely listing HAP sources).
75. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n) (1) (stating criteria for listing EGUs as HAP source
category).
76. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n) (1) (A) (requiring that EPA Administrator conduct
study on potential hazards to human health).
77. See id. (requiring that EPA Administrator determine that regulating EGUs
is "appropriate" and "necessary" based on findings in required report).
10
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pated from EGU emissions. 78 The HAP Report found a "plausible
link" between industrial emissions of mercury and methylmercury
levels in fish.7 9 The EPA was especially concerned with the pros-
pect of women of childbearing age eating contaminated fish, and
the resultant poisoning of the fetus during gestation.80 As a result,
the EPA determined that it was appropriate and necessary to regu-
late mercury emissions from coal- and oil-fired EGUs.81
To facilitate regulating mercury emissions, one of President
George W. Bush's early proposals was the Clean Skies Initiative,
which proposed extending cap-and-trade programs beyond sulfur
dioxide emissions in order to cover power plant emissions of nitro-
gen oxide and mercury emissions. 82 When the Clean Skies Act
stalled in Congress, however, the President and the EPA sought to
utilize their regulatory powers to promulgate a similar regulatory
regime.8 3 The EPA achieved that end by developing two rules: (1)
the CAMR and (2) the Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR). 84
The EPA offered two alternative proposals for regulating mer-
cury emissions from EGUs for public comment.8 5 One proposal
78. See Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825 (Dec. 20, 2000) (re-
leasing EPA findings regarding necessity of regulating HAP emissions by coal- and
oil-fired EGUs).
79. See 1998 EPA HAP REPORT, supra note 14, at 7-43 (finding "plausible link"
between industrial mercury emissions and methylmercury levels in fish).
80. See Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 65
Fed. Reg. at 79,827 (expressing concern over women of child bearing age in-
gesting contaminated fish).
81. See id. at 79,830 (finding it appropriate and necessary to regulate EGU
emissions of mercury).
82. See President George W. Bush, Announcing Clear Skies and Global Cli-
mate Change Initiative, Address at Meeting of the Nat'l Oceanic and Atmospheric
Assoc. (Feb. 14, 2002), available at http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/
news/releases/2002/02/20020214-5.html (announcing Clean Skies Initiative).
83. See Brian H. Potts, Trading Grandfathered Air-A New, Simpler Approach, 31
HARv. ENVrL. L. REv. 115, 127 (2007) (discussing motive behind promulgating
Clean Air Mercury Rule and Clean Air Interstate Rule).
84. See id. (discussing EPA and White House efforts to promulgate regulatory
regime similar to Clean Skies Initiative); see also Rule to Reduce Interstate Trans-
port of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (Clean Air Interstate Rule); Revisions to
Acid Rain Program; Revisions to the NO[x] SIP Call, 70 Fed. Reg. 25,162 (May 12,
2005) (promulgating Clean Air Interstate Rule); Standards of Performance for
New and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 70
Fed. Reg. 28,606 (May 18, 2006) (promulgating Clean Air Mercury Rule).
85. See generally Proposed National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants; and, in the Alternative, Proposed Standards of Performance for New
and Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 69 Fed.
Reg. 4652 (Jan. 30, 2004) (proposing regulating mercury emissions from EGUs
under either section 112 or 111). Notice and comment periods are required
before promulgating emission standards or standards of performance. 42 U.S.C.
2010]
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would have followed the Clinton EPA determination by maintain-
ing the appropriate and necessary finding, setting MACT emission
standards for mercury emissions from EGUs, and regulating these
emissions under section 112 of the CAA. 86 The other proposal was
the CAMR, which would negate the Clinton-EPA appropriate and
necessary finding and would set standards of performance for
EGUs, while supplementing a national cap on mercury emissions
with a cap-and-trade program-a section 111 regulatory program.87
The EPA chose the latter option and adopted the CAMR.88 A simi-
lar cap-and-trade approach was promulgated under the CAIR as
well.89 The EPA noted that reductions in mercury emissions would
most likely result incidentally from the CAIR program. 90
D. Judicial Review of EPA's Interpretations of the Clean Air Act
Challenges to EPA interpretations of the CAA are reviewed
under the deference standard articulated in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council.91 When determining whether to
afford Chevron deference to an agency's interpretation of a statute,
the court is faced with two tasks. 92 First, the court must determine
whether Congress's intent is clear from the plain reading of the
statute.93 If so, both the agency and the reviewing court must "give
effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."94 When
a court finds that Congress's intent is clearly and unambiguously
§ 7607(d) (3) (2006) (setting requirements for promulgating emissions standards
or standards of performance). The decision to add a source category to the sec-
tion 112(c) list does not constitute a final agency action, and does not require
public notice or comment. See id. (lacking any mention of applicability to determi-
nations to add HAP source to source list).
86. See generally Proposed National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air
Pollutants, 69 Fed. Reg. 4652 (offering alternative proposals for regulating mer-
cury emissions from EGUs).
87. See generally id. (proposing alternative regulatory programs for mercury
emissions).
88. See Standards of Performance for New and Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 70 Fed. Reg. at 28,606 (promulgating
Clean Air Mercury Rule).
89. See Rule to Reduce Interstate Transport of Fine Particulate Matter and
Ozone, 70 Fed. Reg. at 25,162 (promulgating Clean Air Interstate Rule).
90. See id. at 25,170 (anticipating reductions in mercury emissions through
implementation of CAIR).
91. 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see also New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 581 (D.C. Cir.
2008) (citing deference test for agency interpretation created in Chevron).
92. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842 (setting out deference standard for statutory
interpretations by appropriate agency).
93. See id. (articulating deference standard for statutory interpretations made
by administrative agencies).
94. Id. at 842-43 (discussing first prong of deference test).
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stated, the inquiry ceases then and there.9 5 Only if the statute does
not speak to the issue at hand will the court move on to the second
task: determining whether the agency's interpretation of the statute
is reasonable.9 6
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In New Jersey v. EPA, a unanimous Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit vacated two final rules promulgated by the
EPA governing mercury emissions from EGUs. 97 The first rule re-
moved coal- and oil-fired EGUs from the list of HAP sources to be
regulated under section 112 (Delisting Rule).9 8 The court reviewed
the issue of whether the delisting was done in accordance with the
removal provisions in section 112(c) (9). 99 The second rule under
review was the CAMR, which set new performance standards for
coal- and oil-fired EGUs, set new mercury emission limits for states
and certain tribal areas, and established a voluntary cap-and-trade
system for new and existing coal-fired EGUs. 100 The EPA conceded
that if the Delisting Rule was inappropriate, the CAMR must fail, as
the Delisting Rule led to CAMR's adoption.10 1
In analyzing the propriety of the EPA's interpretation, the
court used the familiar, two-pronged Chevron deference stan-
dard. 0 2 Under this standard, the court first reviews the statutory
language to determine whether or not Congress's intent is clear.103
If the language is ambiguous (and only if the language is ambigu-
ous), the court will then look to the reasonableness of the agency's
interpretation. 10 4 Here, the court did not see the need to go be-
yond the first prong of the Chevron deference test, having agreed
95. See id. at 842 (noting effect of finding that Congress' intent is clear).
96. See id. at 843 (discussing under what circumstances courts will look to rea-
sonableness of agency interpretation of statutory language).
97. See New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d at 578 (vacating Delisting Rule and CAMR).
98. See generally Revision of December 2000 Regulatory Finding on the Emis-
sions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and
the Removal of Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units from
the Section 112(c) List, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,994 (Mar. 29, 2005) (revising December
2000 "appropriate and necessary" determination).
99. See New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d at 581-83 (reviewing EPA's delisting
decision).
100. See id. at 577 (noting which regulations are under review).
101. See id. at 583 (observing CAMR must fall if Delisting Rule is vacated).
102. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (creating test to determine whether agency determination or interpreta-
tion should be afforded deference).
103. See id. at 842 (setting out first prong of deference standard).
104. See id. at 843 (setting out second prong of deference standard).
2010]
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with the petitioners' contention that once the EPA determined that
EGUs should be regulated under section 112, the EPA no longer
retained authority to delist EGUs without following the delisting
provisions set forth in section 112(c) (9). 105
A. Analyzing Congress' Intent: The Search For Ambiguity
The court looked at the plain language of section 112(c) (9):
The Administrator may delete any source category from
the [section 112(c)(1)] list ... whenever the Administra-
tor... [determines] that emissions from no source in the
category or subcategory concerned . . . exceed a level
which is adequate to protect public health with an ample
margin of safety and no adverse effect will result from
emissions from any source. 106
In analyzing the statutory text, the court was quick to point out that
the delisting provisions apply to "any source category" from the sec-
tion 112(c)(1) list.107 Since there was no exception for EGUs
under the delisting provisions, the court found that the EPA im-
properly removed EGUs from the source category list without mak-
ing the required findings under section 112(c) (9).108
The court rejected the EPA's argument that the statute is, in
fact, ambiguous when looking at section 112(c) (9) in conjunction
with section 112(n) (1).109 The court was not convinced by this ar-
gument, stating that the EPA's strained interpretation was akin to
"deploy[ing] the logic of the Queen of Hearts, substituting EPA's
desires for the plain text of section 112(c)(9)."110 The court
pointed out that section 112(n) (1) concerns how the Administrator
decides to list EGUs as a HAP source, but contains no provisions
concerning the delisting of EGUs.1 1 As such, the court determined
105. See New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d at 582 (finding EPA had no authority to
delist EGUs from HAP source list without going through section 112(c) (9) delist-
ing provisions).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(9) (2006) (articulating circumstances under which
Administrator may remove source categories from HAP source list).
107. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d at 582 (finding language in section 112(c) (9)
applies equally to EGUs and other HAP source categories).
108. See id. (finding that EPA acted improperly in removing EGUs from HAP
source list).
109. See id. (rejecting EPAs contentions that section 112's plain language is
ambiguous).
110. Id. (finding that Congress' intent is clear through section 112(c) (9)).
111. See id. at 582 (discussing lack of procedure for delisting EGUs). The
court was also quick to note that while EGUs had been exempted from some of the
section 112 provisions, those exemptions were narrow and explicitly stated. Id.
14
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that the provisions of section 112(c) (9) were clear, and that it was
bound by the first step of Chevron analysis. 112
B. Analyzing the EPA's "Inherent Authority" Claim
The court also rejected the EPA's contention that, under the
"fundamental principle of administrative law[,] an agency has in-
herent authority to reverse an earlier administrative determination
or ruling where an agency has a principled basis for doing so."' 13
The court agreed that, generally, agencies do have this "inherent
authority," but countered this by noting that Congress has the
power to limit an agency's discretion to reverse itself.'14 Section
112(c) (9) was an exercise of that very power, limiting the EPA's
discretion to remove any source from the list of HAP sources,
thereby precluding the EPA's "inherent authority" claim.' 
15
C. Statutory Requirements Regarding a Previous Delisting
The court rejected the EPA's final claim that because they had
previously delisted HAP sources without following the provisions of
112(c)(9), the agency was not required to follow those provi-
sions.' 16 The court responded that "previous statutory violations
cannot excuse the one now before the court."" 17
In view of the plain language of section 112, the court never
moved beyond step one of Chevron, and vacated the Delisting Rule
as contrary to the plain language of the CAA." 8 Vacating the De-
listing Rule also required vacating the CAMR's regulations for
(determining that Congress's intent is clear through CAA's plain language). "For
example, section 112(c) (6) expressly exempts EGUs from the strict deadlines im-
posed on other sources of certain pollutants." Id. (looking to other statutory provi-
sions in finding Congress' intent to be clear).
112. See New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 582 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (declining to
move on to second prong of Chevron analysis).
113. Id. (rejecting EPA's "inherent authority" claim).
114. See id. at 583 (discussing Congress' power to limit EPA's discretion).
115. Id. at 583 (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 485
(2001)) (finding that Congress intended to limit Administrator's discretion in re-
moving source categories from HAP source list). "EPA may not construe [a] stat-
ute in a way that completely nullifies textually applicable provisions meant to limit
its discretion." Id. The court also pointed out the repercussions of this interpreta-
tion. See id. Accepting the EPA's "inherent authority" claim would invalidate
112(c) (9) altogether, notjust with respect to delisting EGUs, as the EPA "is unable
to explain how... it would not also have the authority to remove any other source
by igitoring the statutory delisting process." New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d at 583 (dis-
cussing implications of EPA's argument).
116. See New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d at 583 (rejecting EPA's argument).
117. Id. (holding EPA to CAA's plain language).
118. See id. (vacating Delisting Rule).
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EGUs.11 9 The CAMR regulations were promulgated under section
111(d), and "under the EPA's own interpretation of the section,
[it] cannot be used to regulate sources listed under section 112."120
Accordingly, the court vacated both rules and remanded the issues
to the EPA for reconsideration. 12 1
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
The D.C. Circuit's opinion in New Jersey v. EPA can best be de-
scribed as an appropriate application of relevant law with a discus-
sion that could have better articulated certain assumptions the
court operated under. 122 The court appropriately applied the law
and reached the correct result, but could have made its discussion
of applicable law clearer. 23 Since the court does not go beyond
step one of the Chevron test, the only question is whether the court
correctly determined that the CAA provisions are unambiguous. 124
Here, the court accurately applied the Chevron test, stopping after
the first step and finding no need to move onto step two as the
statutory language-and through it, Congress's intent-is clear.125
In its petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court, the Utility
Air Regulatory Group (UARG) urged, however, that the court did
not fully analyze the validity of the Delisting Rule and CAMR.126
While there is some weight to this argument, and the court could
have made explicit findings where it instead took certain facts as
given, the concerns that UARG expresses are countered by the
plain language of the CAA and, appropriately, the court opinion
itself.' 27
119. See id. (discussing implications of vacating Delisting Rule).
120. Id. (vacating CAMR).
121. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d at 583-84 (vacating Delisting Rule and
CAMR).
122. For a narrative of the court's opinion, see supra notes 97-121 and accom-
panying text.
123. For a discussion of the scope of the court's opinion, see infra notes 126-
69.
124. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) (stating that interpretation's reasonableness is only to be examined upon
finding that applicable statute's language is ambiguous).
125. See New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d at 582 (determining that there is no need
to move on to step two of Chevron deference test).
126. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at *14-16, Util. Air Regulatory Group v.
NewJersey, No. 08-352, 2008 WL 4294884 (2008) (seeking review of D.C. Circuit's
opinion).
127. For a discussion of the court's treatment of UARG's claim, see infra notes
128-69 and accompanying text.
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The court's opinion presupposes that the 2000 appropriate
and necessary determination was itself lawful-a notion that UARG
urges is not the case. 128 The court's presupposition, however, is
correct.1 29 Before regulating HAP emissions from EGUs, Congress
wanted the EPA to be sure that EGUs needed to be regulated in the
first place. 130 In order to ensure that the EPA has a sound basis for
regulating HAP emissions from EGUs, section 112(n)(1)(A) im-
poses two requirements that the EPA must meet before regulating
EGU emissions: the EPA Administrator must (1) undertake a study
looking into the potential hazards to public health from EGU emis-
sions of HAPs; and (2) make a finding that it is appropriate and
necessary to regulate these emissions.131
While section 307(d) of the CAA does impose a notice and
comment period requirement on emission standards, it makes clear
that the section is only applicable to final agency action promulgat-
ing regulations on HAP emissions.' 32 Section 112 (e) (4), however,
clearly states that the decision to add a HAP source onto the 112(c)
list is not a final agency action subject to judicial review. 133 If these
two sections are read in conjunction with one another, it is undeni-
able that no notice or comment period was necessary to add EGUs
to the section 112(c) list.134
The 2000 appropriate and necessary determination was made
in accordance with these statutory provisions.1 35 Pursuant to sec-
128. See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 126 (urging that 2000 appropriate
and necessary determination was unlawful). "The D.C. Circuit erred in ignoring
CAA § 112(n)'s threshold requirements and focusing exclusively on another provi-
sion of the statute [section 112(c) (9)] to require, under the guise of a Chevron step
one analysis, future EPA Administrators to proceed with unlawful rulemaking." Id.
at *4.
129. For a discussion of why the court's presupposition is correct, see infra
notes 130-43.
130. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n) (1) (A) (2006) (requiring EPA Administrator to
determine whether regulating HAP emissions from EGUs is "appropriate and
necessary").
131. See id. (setting out requirements that Administrator must satisfy in order
to regulate HAP emissions from EGUs).
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) (3) (2006) (imposing requirements for notice
and comment period before promulgating rules, regulations and emission
standards).
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e) (4) (2006) (suspending judicial review until emis-
sion standards are promulgated).
134. See id. (removing additions to section 112(c) list from specter ofjudicial
review); 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(3) (imposing notice and comment period require-
ments only when promulgating final rules and regulations).
135. See generally Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollu-
tants from Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 65 Fed. Reg. 79,825 (Dec. 20,
2000) (outlining statutory authority and policy reasons for adding EGUs to section
112(c) list of HAP sources).
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tion 112(n) (1) (A), the EPA conducted a study of the potential
health effects of HAP emissions from EGUs. 13 6 The EPA then eval-
uated the findings, ultimately concluding that mercury is the HAP
of greatest concern.137 The EPA found that roughly sixty percent
of mercury emissions came from anthropogenic sources, with thirty
percent of those emissions coming from EGUs, posing a public
health threat and environmental danger. 38 On account of this
finding, the Administrator found that "regulation of HAP emissions
from coal- and oil-fired electric utility steam generating units under
section 112 [of the CAA] is appropriate and necessary." 139 Accord-
ingly, coal- and oil-fired EGUs were added to the list of HAP sources
under section 112(c).1 40 The addition was made official by publica-
tion in the Federal Register fourteen months later.141 The required
study had been conducted, and the required finding had been
made. 42 Though the court should have made a stronger effort to
articulate the presumption that the 2000 determination was valid,
the presupposition was correct and was an appropriate premise to
work from. 143
Building off of this premise, the court utilized the Chevron def-
erence standard to determine whether the EPA's delisting was ap-
propriate. 144 The court made it only through the first prong of the
Chevron test, ultimately finding that section 112(c) (9)'s plain lan-
guage was unambiguous and Congress' intent clear. 145 The court's
136. See 1998 EPA HAP REPORT, supra note 14 (discussing health effects of
HAPs emitted by EGUs).
137. Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 65
Fed. Reg. at 79,827 (expressing concern over health effects of mercury exposure).
The EPA looked at multipathway exposure for six HAPs: mercury, radionuclides,
arsenic, cadmium, lead and dioxins. Of these, the EPA determined that mercury
posed the greatest health concern, as it is "highly toxic, persistent, and bioaccumu-
lates in food chains." Id.
138. See id. (discussing findings justifying regulating HAP emissions from
EGUs).
139. Id. at 79,830 (finding that regulating HAP emissions from EGUs is ap-
propriate and necessary).
140. Id. (determining that EGUs should be added to HAP source list).
141. See generally National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants:
Revision of Source Category List Under Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 67 Fed.
Reg. 6521 (Feb. 12, 2002) (revising section 112(c) HAP source category list).
142. See generally Regulatory Finding on the Emissions of Hazardous Air Pollu-
tants, 65 Fed. Reg. at 79,825 (discussing study of HAP emissions from EGUs and
finding that regulation is appropriate and necessary).
143. See NewJersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (making no explicit
finding that 2000 determination was valid).
144. See id. at 581 (applying Chevron deference standard).
145. See id. at 582 (finding it unnecessary to go beyond first prong of Chevron
deference test).
18
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reasoning on this matter centered on three words: "any source cate-
gory."'14 6 These three words were vital to the court reaching its cor-
rect conclusion that the Delisting Rule was inappropriately
undertaken. 147 While an entire judicial opinion resting on just
three words in a statute thousands of words long may seem like in-
terpretation by piecemeal, the court actually addressed all of the
appropriate provisions and properly applied the Chevron deference
test. 148
The court appropriately interpreted statutory provisions that
the EPA and amici urged were in conflict with one another-sec-
tions 112(c)(9) and 112(n)(1)(A).1 49 The court correctly noted
that the provisions in section 112(n) (1) (A) applied only to adding
EGUs to the list, and was completely devoid of any provisions appli-
cable to removing EGUs from the section 112(c) list.150 In light of
the limited application of section 112 (n) (1) (A), the court properly
determined that removing EGUs from the HAP source list would be
subject to the fallback provisions of section 112(c) (9); "any source
category" must apply to EGUs just as it would to all other source
categories. 151 In declining to read ambiguity into the statute, the
court followed Congress's intent, as evidenced by the statutory lan-
guage, and correctly applied the Chevron standard, appropriately
binding the EPA to the statute's plain language. 152
The court also correctly rejected the EPA's claim that it pos-
sesses the authority to reverse its own prior determinations under
the "fundamental principle of administrative law that an agency has
inherent authority to reverse an earlier administrative determina-
146. See generally id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c) (9)) (construing "any source
category" to apply to EGUs).
147. See generally id. (relying on term "any source category" to reach determi-
nation that EPA violated CAA provisions in promulgating CAMR).
148. See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 126, at 23 (appealing circuit court
decision to United States Supreme Court).
In this case the court's gaze never deviated from three words-'any source
category'-as the basis for its holding... Had the court read CAA § 112
'as a whole,' it could not have concluded that.., the Agency was never-
theless precluded from removing EGUs from the CAA § 112 source list.
Petition for Certiorari, supra note 126, at 23.
149. See NewJersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d at 582 (rejecting EPA's argument that sec-
tions 112(c) (9) and 112(n) (1) (A) were in conflict).
150. See id. (analyzing section 112(n) (1) (A)'s applicability to removing EGUs
from section 112(c) source list).
151. See id. (finding EPA is unable to point to any persuasive reason why sec-
tion 112(c) (9) is ambiguous when applying to removing EGUs from HAP source
list).
152. See id. (holding EPA to statutory provisions of section 112(c) (9)).
20101
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tion." 153 Normally, administrative agencies possess this power. 154
At the same time, however, Congress has inherent authority to limit
an agency's discretion as Congress sees fit.155 Perhaps seeing the
potential for this sort of conflict-two different Administrations
having two different views on how appropriate certain environmen-
tal regulations may be-Congress intentionally limited the EPA's
discretion to remove IAP sources from the list without first making
specific determinations. 156
As the court points out, allowing this claim to succeed would
effectively nullify section 112(c) (9) in its entirety. 57 A finding that
the agency's "inherent authority" overrides congressional mandate
would allow the EPA to remove any HAP source from the source list
without making any finding whatsoever. 158 The EPA would be able
to remove a source on a mere whim. 159
An interesting issue left open by the court's opinion relates to
UARG's contention that the 2000 determination was invalid: to
what degree the section 112(c) (9) removal provisions apply to EPA
determinations that did not meet statutory requirements for addi-
tion to the HAP source list.160 The court declined to answer this
question. 61 The issue, therefore, remains unresolved. 162
153. Id. (quoting Brief of Respondent at 22 (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
154. See NewJersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d at 583-84 (agreeing administrative agencies
typically have authority to reverse themselves).
155. See id. (discussing Congress's power to limit agency discretion).
156. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c) (9) (2006) (requiring EPA to make finding that
no source in category emits HAPs above level adequate to protect public health
with ample margin of safety before removing source from HAP source list).
157. See NewJersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d at 583 (considering ramifications of EPA's
"inherent authority" claim).
158. See id. (rejecting EPA's "inherent authority" claim).
159. See id. (rejecting EPA's "inherent authority" claim).
160. See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 126, at *24 (urging EGUs may be
removed from HAP source list without meeting section 112(c)(9) requirements
because addition to the list was never in accordance with requirements set forth
under section 112(n) (1) (A)).
161. New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d at 584 (declining to review other contentions
of parties to suit). "[T]he court does not reach other contentions of petitioners or
intervenors." Id.
162. See id. (declining to entertain intervenors' contentions relating to under-
lying validity of EGU's addition to HAP source list). This issue raises the question
of whether mere presence on the list is sufficient to trigger section 112(c) (9) re-
moval provisions, or if the underlying rationale for the source being added to the
list in the first place is relevant to the inquiry. See Petition for Certiorari, supra note
126, at *25 (urging that because regulating EGUs was not deemed appropriate and
necessary pursuant to statutory mandate EGUs may be delisted without making
required 112(c) (9) finding). For example, under section 112(n) (4) (B), in order
to add oil and gas wells to the HAP source list, the Administrator must limit the
20
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Prior to this case, the EPA made the required finding that reg-
ulating mercury emissions is "appropriate and necessary."' 163 The
court did not look to the underlying validity of the 2000 determina-
tion that it was "appropriate and necessary" to add EGUs to the
HAP source list.' 6 4 It would seem anomalous to hold the EPA to
strict adherence to the removal provisions without holding it to
equally strict adherence to the addition provisions. 165 This seems
to be a point that the court, quite simply, missed.' 66 In this case,
however, the point was moot, as adding EGUs to the HAP source
list requires less procedural determinations by the EPA than remov-
ing those same substances. 167 The question, however, remains
open and illustrates why the initial inquiry into the validity of addi-
tions to the HAP source list is an important step in determining
whether the removal provisions apply in any particular instance. 68
The court would have been well served to make this initial inquiry
and resolve the question.1 69
emission standards to areas with more than one million people, and must deter-
mine that HAP emissions from these wells "present more than a negligible risk of
adverse effects to public health." 42 U.S.C. § 7412(n) (4) (B) (2006) (limiting
EPA's authority to add oil and gas wells to HAP source list). If the EPA fails to
make the finding that the wells present a greater than negligible risk of harm to
public health, is the agency still bound by the section 112(c) (9) removal provi-
sions? What if the EPA requires that emissions standards be met in an area with
only 800,000 people? Taking the court's opinion on its face, it would seem that
the section 112(c) (9) removal provisions would still apply; the mere presence on
the HAP source list is sufficient to trigger the removal requirements. See generally
New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574 (making no inquiry into validity of determination to
add EGUs to HAP source list). That initial inquiry into the validity of the addition
was never made, so the question remains open. See generally id. (making no inquiry
into underlying validity of determination to add EGUs to HAP source list). The
removal provisions, therefore, seem to apply.
163. See supra notes 128-43 and accompanying text (noting EPA's compliance
with section 112(n) (1) (A) in determining regulating mercury emissions from
EGUs is "appropriate and necessary").
164. See generally New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574 (making no inquiry into valid-
ity of determination to add EGUs to HAP source list).
165. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(c)(9), 7412(n)(1)(A), 7412(n)(4)(B) (setting
removal and addition criteria for HAP source list).
166. See generally New Jersey v. EPA, 574 F.3d 517 (operating under assumption
that underlying appropriate and necessary determination was valid).
167. See supra notes 128-43 and accompanying text (concluding EPA made
required statutory findings in determining regulating mercury emissions from
EGUs is "appropriate and necessary").
168. See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 126, at *25 (questioning whether
section 112(c)(9) removal provisions apply to additions that failed to meet their
statutory requirements).
169. See id. (discussing application of delisting provisions to source categories
that did not go through required findings before being added to HAP source list).
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VI. IMPAcT
This case is not interesting because it charts new legal waters;
the applicable law is relatively straightforward.1 70 This case is not
even interesting because the court uses Lewis Carroll to describe
the EPA's interpretation; the D.C. Circuit has done this before.1 71
Rather, this case is interesting because of the practical implications
of regulating HAP emissions. 172 As a result of this decision, new
power plants will be subject to the more stringent MACT emission
standards, as opposed to the more lenient cap-and-trade regula-
tions under the CAMR.173 The decision also opens the door to ap-
plying this MACT regulatory regime to pollutants not yet on the
section 112(b) list of HAPs, notably CO 2. 174
A. The Future of Mercury Regulations
Since the Supreme Court has denied certiorari for this case, 175
there is not much uncertainty as to what will ultimately happen with
mercury regulations as a result of the D.C. Circuit's holding in New
Jersey v. EPA; the regulations will become stricter. 176 In order to
remove EGUs from the source list, the EPA would have to follow
170. For a discussion of the applicable law, see supra notes 60-96, 128-69 and
accompanying text.
171. See New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880, 887 (D.C. Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127
S. Ct. 2127 (2007) (rejecting EPA's interpretation of section 111 (a) (4) of CAA).
"Only in a Humpty Dumpty world would Congress be required to use superfluous
words while an agency could ignore an expansive word that Congress did use. We
decline to adopt such a world-view." Id. New Jersey v. EPA is just one in a long
string of cases where the D.C. Circuit has spoken with one common theme: read
the statute. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. EPA, 536 F.3d 673 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (vacating
rule preventing state and local authorities from supplementing inadequate moni-
toring requirements for certain stationary pollution sources); North Carolina v.
EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (vacating Clean Air Interstate Rule); Sierra
Club v. EPA, 479 F.3d 875 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (vacating emissions standards for brick
and ceramics kilns); New York v. EPA, 443 F.3d 880 (vacating Equipment Replace-
ment Provisions).
172. For a discussion of the practical implications of regulating HAP emis-
sions, see infra notes 175-223.
173. See Mercury: NRDC's Walke Discusses Impact of Court Decision ReJecting EPA
Emissions Regulation, E&ETV, (Mar. 5, 2008) (discussing impact on new power
plants), available at http://www.eenews.net/tv/transcript/762.
174. See Daniel Brian, Regulating Carbon Dioxide Under the Clean Air Act as a
Hazardous Air Pollutant, 33 COLUM.J. ENVrL. L. 369, 382-83 (2008) (noting that New
Jersey v. EPA decision does not bar EPA from regulating CO2 emissions by EGUs
under section 112).
175. See Util. Air Reg. Group v. New Jersey, 129 S. Ct. 1308 (2009) (denying
petition for certiorari), cert. dismissed, 129 S. Ct. 1313 (2009).
176. See CRS, CASE REPORT, supra note 25, at 4 (discussing implications of New
Jersey v. EPA on future mercury regulations).
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the removal provisions in section 112(c) (9).177 These provisions
are very restrictive, requiring that the EPA find that HAP emissions
from EGUs do not "exceed a level which is adequate to protect pub-
lic health with an ample margin of safety and no adverse environ-
mental effect will result from [EGU] emissions." 178 This finding,
however, would be almost impossible to make, as EGUs emit
roughly forty-eight tons of mercury annually.' 79
The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari has cleared the road
for the EPA to develop new mercury regulations for coal- and oil-
fired EGUs. 180 In accordance with the D.C. Circuit's opinion, the
EPA will have to regulate EGU emissions of mercury under section
112, which requires that MACT standards be implemented.' 8 ' In
2004, the EPA had proposed MACT standards alongside the cap-
and-trade system that would ultimately be the CAMR.182 The EPA,
however, did not promulgate these MACT regulations, and opted
to implement CAMR instead. 183
The problem with these standards, however, is that significant
advances have been made in the technology available to reduce
EGU mercury emissions in the five years that have passed since they
were drafted.' 84 The EPA, therefore, will have to promulgate new
177. See 42 U.S.C. 7412(c) (9) (2006) (containing removal provisions for HAP
source categories).
178. Id. (setting forth requirements for removing HAP sources from section
112 list).
179. See LARRY PARKER & JOHN BLODGEr, CONG. RES. SERV., ORD. No.
RL34018, AIR QUALITY: MULTI-POLLUTANT LEGISLATION IN THE 11OTH CONGRESS 1
(2008) [hereinafter CRS, MULTI-POLLUTANT LEGISLATION], available at http://ncse-
online.org/NLE/CRSreports/08Mar/RL34018.pdf (discussing EGU emissions of
pollutants). "Electric utility generating facilities are a major source of air pollution
... includ[ing] several pollutants that directly pose risks to human health and
welfare, [such as] mercury." Id.
180. See Dean, supra note 36, at A16 (reporting on Supreme Court's denial of
certiorari); Editorial, Clean Slate on Clean Air, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, at WK9
(urging Obama Administration to develop robust emissions standards for mercury
and fine particulates).
181. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (requiring maximum achievable reduction
standards for new and existing HAP sources).
182. See Proposed National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants;
and, in the Alternative, Proposed Standards of Performance for New and Existing
Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Steam Generating Units, 69 Fed. Reg. 4652
(Jan. 30, 2004) (putting forth alternative proposals for regulating EGU emissions
of mercury).
183. See generally Revision of December 2000 Regulatory Finding on the Emis-
sions of Hazardous Air Pollutants from Electric Utility Steam Generating Units and
the Removal of Coal- and Oil-Fired Electric Utility Steam Generating Units from
the Section 112(c) List, 70 Fed. Reg. 15,994 (Mar. 29, 2005) (adopting CAMR).
184. See CRS, CASE REPORT, supra note 25, at 4 (discussing implications of New
Jersey v. EPA decision on new and existing EGUs).
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MACT standards in order to be in compliance with section 112.185
This process could end up taking as long as three years, as the EPA
will need to compile information on the effectiveness of available
emission reduction technology.1 86
For the time being, new EGUs and modifications to existing
EGUs will be subject to a provision of the CAA known as the
"MACT hammer."'187 Under the MACT hammer, if no applicable
HAP emission limits are set for a source category, there may not be
construction of, or modification to, a major source in the category
until the EPA or the delegated state agency has made an individual-
ized determination that the particular unit will meet standards
equivalent to or better than maximum achievable emission
controls.18 8
The MACT hammer would subject new and existing coal- and
oil-fired EGUs to very strict pollution control requirements.18 9 New
sources would be required to implement pollution control proce-
dures that achieve the "maximum degree of reduction in emis-
sions," as determined by the "best controlled similar source" in
practice. 190 Existing coal- and oil-fired EGUs would not be re-
quired to meet the same levels as new EGUs, but would still be sub-
185. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2) (requiring any HAP emission standards be
tailored to achieve maximum degree of reduction in HAP emissions from new and
existing HAP sources).
186. See CRS, CASE REPORT, supra note 25, at 5 (analyzing current state and
future direction of EGU mercury emission standards). Several bills in Congress
might help speed this process along. In 2007, five multi-pollutant bills were intro-
duced in Congress, each of which would regulate CO 2, S02, NO., and mercury
emissions, seeking a ninety percent reduction in mercury reductions by various
deadlines ranging from 2011-2015. See Clean Air/Climate Change Act of 2007, S.
1168, 110th Cong. (2007); Clean Air Planning Act of 2007, S. 1177, 110th Cong.
(2007); Clean Power Act of 2007, S. 1201, 110th Cong. (2007); Energy Indepen-
dence, Clean Air, and Climate Security Act of 2007, S. 1554, 110th Cong. (2007);
Healthy Air and Clean Water Act, H.R. 3989, 110th Cong. (2007). Less than one
week after the New Jersey v. EPA decision was passed down, Senator Thomas Carper
(D-DE) introduced a bill specifically targeting mercury emissions. See Mercury
Emissions Control Act, S. 2643, 110th Cong. (2008). The bill would mandate that
emission regulations for mercury be promulgated by October 1, 2008. Id. (seeking
to expedite promulgation of mercury regulations).
187. See CRS, CASE REPORT, supra note 25, at 5 (characterizing section
1 12 (g)( 2 ) as "MACT hammer"); see also 42 U.S.C. § 74 12(g)( 2 ) (setting require-
ments for HAP sources that appear on source list, but whose emission standards
have not yet been promulgated).
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g) (2) (requiring Administrator or delegated state
agency to make finding that new source will meet maximum achievable emission
controls in cases where no applicable emission standards exist).
189. See id. (limiting circumstances under which new HAP source categories
can be constructed or modified).
190. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (3) (setting standards by which HAP emissions
must be regulated for new source categories).
24
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2010], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol21/iss1/3
OUT OF THE RABBIT HOLE
ject to very stringent emission requirements in their own right.191
Existing coal- and oil-fired EGUs would be required to bring their
mercury emissions below "the average emission [levels]
achieved by the best performing 12 percent of the existing
sources."
192
This is exactly the case with EGU emissions of mercury-as a
result of the NewJersey v. EPA opinion, there are no emissions stan-
dards on the books for mercury.' 93 Any newly built EGUs or modi-
fications to existing EGUs will be subject to a case-by-case
determination by the EPA or the delegated state agency to ensure
that the new or modified EGU will meet maximum achievable emis-
sion standards. 194 More lawsuits seeking to enforce this provision
can be expected. 195
191. See id. (noting that existing HAP source categories need not be subject to
emission standards as stringent as new HAP source categories).
192. See id. For categories or subcategories with fewer than 30 sources, the
metric is the average emission levels of the five best performing sources instead of
the best performing twelve percent. Id. (setting standards by which HAP emission
regulations must be set for existing source categories).
193. See CRS, CASE REPORT, supra note 25, at 5-6 (discussing application of
MACT hammer on construction of new EGUs and modifications of existing
EGUs). Some claimed that striking down the CAMR left the US without a national
regulatory program to cut mercury emissions. See Felicity Barringer, Appellate Panel
Rejects E.P.A. Emissions Limits, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 9, 2008, at A13 (discussing facts of
New Jersey v. EPA and reactions to decision). This was not entirely true, though.
The Clean Air Interstate Rule (CAIR) imposed a multi-pollutant cap-and-trade
aimed particularly at SO2 and NO, emissions. See Rule to Reduce Interstate Trans-
port of Fine Particulate Matter and Ozone (Clean Air Interstate Rule), 70 Fed.
Reg. 25,162 (May 12, 2005) (promulgating CAIR). CAIR would reduce SO2 and
NO, emissions from EGUs, and would have an incidental effect on mercury emis-
sions as well. Id. at 25,170 (discussing incidental effects on mercury emissions). In
fact, the first phase of mercury reductions provided for in the CAMR-a twenty-
nine percent reduction in mercury emissions by EGUs by 2010-was to be
achieved entirely from incidental mercury reductions under the CAIR cap-and-
trade program. See Posting of John Walke to Natural Resource Defense Council
Switchboard, http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/jwalke/faqabout the-court_
decisiono.html (Feb. 10, 2008) (countering claims that vacatur of CAMR left EPA
without national mercury emission regulatory scheme). CAIR was completely un-
affected by the New Jersey v. EPA decision. Id. (discussing effect of New Jersey v. EPA
decision on CAIR). The D.C. Circuit later vacated CAIR, then reversed itself, per-
mitting CAIR to remain in effect until it is replaced with a valid regulation. North
Carolina v. EPA, 531 F.3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (vacating CAIR in its entirety), rev'd
in part, 550 F.3d 1176 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (reversing decision to vacate CAIR and
charging EPA with task of replacing CAIR with new rule).
194. See 42 U.S.C. § 7 412(g) (2) (requiring Administrator or delegated state
agency to make case by case determinations on whether maximum achievable con-
trol technology emissions limitations have been met for constructions of new HAP
sources and modifications of existing HAP sources).
195. See Sierra Club Threatens Suits over Coal Power Plants, REUTERS, May 6, 2008,
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSN065173902
0080507 (discussing Sierra Club's threats to sue several energy companies in effort
to enforce New Jersey v. EPA decision); see also Memorandum and Order, S. Alliance
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B. A Springboard for Regulating New HAPs?
The D.C. Circuit's decision in New Jersey v. EPA may end up
being an enormous gift for a future EPA Administrator who wishes
to aggressively reduce emissions of HAPs not yet on the list, such as
greenhouse gases like CO 2.' 96 The court made clear that the sec-
tion 112 list is source-specific, not pollutant-specific, and since EGUs
remain listed on the section 112(c) list, this relatively short opinion
may end up packing quite a punch for future regulation of other
pollutants, including greenhouse gases. 197
What the court effectively did in this case is hold that once a
HAP source category is on the source list, it stays on the source list
until the EPA determines that the particular source category no
longer emits HAPs at a level dangerous to public health or to the
environment. 198 Essentially, the court banned regulating emissions
from these source categories under section 111 (d) -a ban that is
source-specific, not pollutant-specific.199
When viewed from this angle, the holding begs the question,
"What are these HAP sources emitting that is not on the list of
HAPs?" The bar is set very high for emission standards under sec-
tion 112.200 The statutory requirements for setting emission stan-
dards provides a good foundation to set a regulatory regime aimed
at pollutants not yet on the list of IAPs, but still emitted by HAP
source categories. 20 1
Think CO 2. CO 2 is without question the most infamous green-
house gas.20 2 Recently, the Supreme Court held that the EPA has
for Energy v. Duke Energy Carolinas, LLC, No. 1:2008cv00318, (W.D.N.C. Dec. 2,
2008) (seeking to enjoin Duke Energy from constructing new coal-fired EGU with-
out obtaining MACT determination).
196. See generally Brian, supra note 174 (advocating regulation of CO2 as haz-
ardous air pollutant under section 112 of CAA).
197. See id. at 382-83 (noting court's ban on regulating EGU HAP emissions
under section 111 (d) is source-, not pollutant-specific).
198. See New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574, 582 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (vacating
CAMR). "[B]ecause section 112(c)(9) governs the removal of 'any source cate-
gory' from the section 112(c)(1) list . . . the only way EPA could remove EGUs
from the section 112(c) (1) list was by satisfying section 112(c) (9)'s requirements."
Id.
199. See Brian, supra note 174, at 383 (discussing scope of New Jersey v. EPA
holding).
200. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (2) (2006) (requiring that emission standards for
IAP emissions be set to achieve maximum degree of emission reductions for
source categories on section 112(c) (1) list).
201. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (2) (setting forth provisions for periodic review
and revision of HAP list).
202. See RicHARD B. ALLEY ET AL., A REPORT OF WORKING GROUP I OF THE IN-
TERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL FOR CLIMATE CHANGE: SUMMARY FOR POLICYMAKERS 2
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the authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from automo-
biles under the CAA.20 3 Though the Court's holding directly ad-
dressed only the EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gases
under section 202 (a) (1) of the CAA, "the finding that carbon diox-
ide is an air pollutant would apply with respect to Clean Air Act
provisions well beyond section 202(a) (1)."204 In fact, the finding
seems to apply nicely to section 112(b), as that section gives the
EPA broad discretion in deciding how the HAP list should
change. 205
There is a case to be made for regulating CO 2 as a HAP .206
Section 112 allows additions to be made on the basis of risk of envi-
ronmental harm, and the evidence supporting environmental dam-
age stemming from greenhouse gas emissions and resultant global
wanning continues to grow.20 7 Furthermore, if greenhouse gases
were added to the HAP list, the MACT provisions in section 112
would allow the EPA to have an enormous effect on greenhouse gas
emissions in one fell swoop. 20 8 EGUs, for example, have emitted
well over two billion metric tons of CO 2 annually between 2000 and
2005.209 If CO 2 were to be added to the HAP list, EGUs could be
subject to MACT standards-a move that would significantly reduce
CO 2 emissions.
2 10
(2007), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wgl /ar4-wgl-
spm.pdf, (noting rising concentrations of CO 2 and resultant effects on climate).
The 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has even gone so far as to
call CO 2 "the most important anthropogenic greenhouse gas." Id.
203. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007) (holding that EPA has
authority under CAA to regulate greenhouse gases).
204. Johnathan S. Martel, Climate Change Law and Litigation in the Aftermath of
Massachusetts v. EPA, DAILY EN ,'T REP., Vol. 7, No. 214, Nov. 6, 2007, at 3, repro-
duced at, http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/BNA-Ar-
ticeMartel1107.pdf (noting that Massachusetts v. EPA holding may apply to
several sections other than section 202(a) (1) of CAA).
205. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(2) (granting Administrator authority to add or
remove HAPs from list "where appropriate").
206. For a thorough discussion of the costs and benefits of regulating CO 2 as
a HAP, see Brian, supra note 174, at 395-415 (weighing pros and cons for regulat-
ing CO 2 as HAP).
207. See id. at 398-403 (discussing adverse effects of ambient CO2 concentra-
tions and CO 2 depositions onto surface ocean waters).
208. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (2) (requiring maximum degree of emission re-
duction for HAP sources on source list).
209. See CRS, MULTI-POLLUTANT LEGISLATION, supra note 179, at 1 (providing
chart with CO 2 emissions for 2000-05). Fossil-fuel EGUs emitted 2.429 billion met-
ic tons of CO2 in 2000, 2.389 billion metric tons in 2001, 2.395 billion metric tons
in 2002, 2.415 billion metric tons in 2003, 2.456 billion metric tons in 2004, and
2.513 billion metric tons in 2005. Id.
210. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (requiring maximum degree of emission reduc-
tion for HAP sources on source list).
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The new EPA Administrator, Lisa Jackson, seems to be moving
in this direction in announcing a proposed national system for re-
porting greenhouse gas emissions, including CO 2 emissions, by ma-
jor U.S. sources. 211 These reporting requirements would apply to
any facility that emits 25,000 metric tons or more of greenhouse
gases annually. 212 More than 13,000 facilities, spanning dozens of
different energy-intensive industries (including coal- and oil-fired
EGUs) would be required to report their emission levels of green-
house gases. 213 These reporting obligations will provide the EPA
with comprehensive and accurate information regarding green-
house gas emissions across the country and across different sectors
of the national economy.2 14 The EPA has made clear that this data
is essential to developing a comprehensive regulatory program for
greenhouse gas emissions.2 15
These reporting requirements seem like a logical first step in
any move to add greenhouse gases to the list of HAPs. 216 The
MACT provisions require that emission standards for new and ex-
isting HAP source categories be set according to the best perform-
ing sources. 217 In order to promulgate regulations relative to
existing sources, they must know what these sources are emitting. 218
Should this new reporting requirement be promulgated, it is likely
211. See Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, , EPA Proposes First National Re-
porting on Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Mar. 10, 2009) (on file with author) (pro-
posing national reporting obligations of greenhouse gas emissions produced by
major U.S. sources).
212. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PROPOSED MANDATORY GREENHOUSE GAS RE-
PORTING RULE: FACT SHEET 1, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/
downloads/ProposedRule-FactSheet.pdf [hereinafter EPA FACT SHEET] (outlining
provisions of Proposed Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Reporting Rule).
213. See Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Proposes First Nat'l Reporting
on Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Mar. 10, 2009) (on file with author) (discussing
which facilities proposed rule will affect).
214. See id. (discussing necessity of accurate data for developing comprehen-
sive regulatory program for greenhouse gas emissions); see also ENVrL. PROT.
AGENCY, PROPOSED RULE: MANDATORY REPORTING OF GREENHOUSE GASES, ELECTRIC.
rrv GENERATION 1, http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/emissions/downloads/
ElecticityGeneration.pdf (discussing applicability of proposed rule to EGUs).
215. See EPA FACT SHEET, supra note 212, at I (noting reporting requirements
will give EPA essential information to inform future policy decisions).
216. Cf id. (announcing that reporting requirements will provide EPA with
useful information for developing future regulatory policies).
217. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d) (3) (2006) (setting forth requirements for devel-
oping emission standards for new and existing HAP source categories).
218. See id. (requiring that emission standards be set according to existing
sources with lowest emissions); see also Press Release, EPA Proposes First National
Reporting on Greenhouse Gas Emissions, supra note 213 (discussing how EPA will
utilize data received through required reporting from greenhouse gas sources).
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that any regulatory regime covering greenhouse gases will cite this
data in setting emission standards. 219
Adding greenhouse gases to the HAP list would be a bold
move. In fact, the EPA has not added a single pollutant to the HAP
list, though it did consider adding CO2 in the 1990s. 220 At some
point in the future, however, an aggressive EPA Administrator (be
it Ms. Jackson or some future Administrator) might find it benefi-
cial to do just that.
The most direct, immediate, and likely effect of this opinion is
subjecting new EGUs to the MACT hammer.221 New regulations
will likely be on the way over the next few years, unless Congress
passes legislation in an effort to get the EPA moving on promulgat-
ing those regulations.222 The more controversial-but more inter-
esting-result of this case, however, may well not be seen for some
time. A future Administrator who is feeling brave may very well
take this case to mean that EGUs (as well as other source catego-
ries) are stuck on the -LAP source list, and end up adding HAPs
(such as greenhouse gases) to the HAP list.223 It would be a contro-
versial move to be sure, but the MACT requirements would have a
rapid and substantial impact on emissions of those newly-listed
HAPs.
J. Brian Hudson*
219. See EPA FACT SHEET, supra note 212, at 1 (noting that data received
through required reporting will be used to inform future policy decisions).
220. See Gov'T. ACCOUNTABILITv OFF., GAO-06-669, CLEAN AIR ACT: EPA
SHOULD IMPROVE THE MANAGEMENT OF ITS AIR Toxics PROGRAM 4 (2006) (criticiz-
ing EPA for failing to update HAP list); VERONIQUE BUGNION AND DAVID M. REINER,
MITJorr PROGRAM ON THE Scl & POL'Y OF GLOBAL CHANGE, REP. No. 57, A GAME
OF CLIMATE CHICKEN: CAN EPA REGULATE GREENHOUSE GASES BEFORE THE U.S. SEN-
ATE RATIFIES THE KYOTO PROTOCOL? 15-16 (1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/
new.items/d06669.pdf (citing Memorandum from Michael Shelby, Office of Pol'y,
Plan & Evaluation to Karl Hausker, David Doniger, and Dick Morgenstern, Envtl.
Prot. Agency (May 31, 1994), available at http://globalchange.mit.edu/files/docu-
ment/MITJPSPGCRpt57.pdf. (discussing possibility of regulating CO2 under sec-
tion 112)).
221. For a discussion of the effects of the MACT hammer, see supra notes 187-
95 and accompanying text.
222. For a discussion of the likely development of the regulatory scheme and
the effect that certain legislation might have, see supra notes 180-87 and accompa-
nying text.
223. For a discussion of the possibility of adding pollutants to the HAP list,
see supra notes 196-223 and accompanying text.
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